Indian companies are also not usually running second to the Chinese in many sectors, especially in cutting-edge technology domains. The pressures on or exit of Chinese companies under Europe’s new laws, thus, might not necessarily create openings for Indian companies to take advantage of. What is, therefore, likely to happen, is similar to what has happened with Indian expectations of friend-shoring.
Foreign multinationals did not actually leave China in such large numbers following the beginning of the US-China trade war or supply chain disruptions in the wake of the Covid pandemic. And when they did leave, they did not necessarily move to India. The second implication lies within the political and diplomatic spheres.
India stands out from China due to its democratic system and reputation for upholding international law and treaty obligations. However, amid a growing rightward shift in domestic politics across various parts of Europe and the shockwaves from the conflict in its neighbouring region, there might be limited acceptance for India if European capitals and the public fail to positively identify with it. So far, there has been grudging respect in Europe for India’s tough negotiating positions in multilateral forums and for its stance on the Russia-Ukraine conflict.
However, as concerns grow about India’s democratic backsliding and if Indian foreign policy is going to be used for domestic signalling in India – external affairs minister S. Jaishankar’s brand of ‘wolf warrior’ diplomacy is a case in point – European goodwill for India is likely to dissipate and New Delhi is likely to be seen in the same category with Beijing as a potential challenger to European interests. India will have made the mistake of
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