In Russia, All Policy Roads Lead to the War
Vladimir Putin broke with tradition when delivering his New Year’s televised address on the last day of 2022. For more than two decades, the Russian president had appeared alone, usually in front of imposing Kremlin backdrops. This time, he stood before a group of men and women in military uniforms who he said had been taking part in the “special military operation"—the Kremlin’s code for its brutal war against Ukraine.
It was a sign of things to come. The 12 months following Putin’s unorthodox address have shown that the war is at the core of Russia’s domestic, economic and foreign policy—the organizing principle around which most decisions are made. First, on domestic politics: My colleagues Andrei Kolesnikov and Denis Volkov have found that the war has general approval among about 75% of the population.
Many Russians see the conflict as one between their country and the West, not Ukraine. More specifically, my colleagues have found that up to 22% of the population strongly support the war and oppose cessation of hostilities. Another 53% are somewhat more passive in their support, and most of them agree with the government’s course.
So if tomorrow, Putin would argue that Russia should start peace negotiations, many of these people would accept that, too. What war? That data reinforces what is clear on the ground—that the war has been fully internalized by the majority of Russians, at both the popular and elite levels. It makes sense.
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